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PSST! WANNA BUY A BRIDGE? 
IP TRANSFERS OF NON-EXISTENT PROPERTY 
Stephen T. Black* 
ABSTRACT 
It is common practice when hiring a researcher at a university or a 
laboratory to require the new employee to sign a patent transfer 
agreement—essentially to agree to give to the employer any 
inventions that the employee may conceive of during his 
employment. However, the nature of that pre-invention agreement—
which until 1991 was universally thought of as imposing an equitable 
duty but not as an actual transfer of legal title to an imaginary asset—
has been changed by the Federal Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court. 
This Article reviews more than 170 years of legal history dealing 
with transfers of non-existent assets, and argues that the concept of 
an “automatic” assignment in patent law rests on shaky ground. 
Instead, our system of IP law is much better served by a return to 
common law principles—both “first in time, first in right” and “you 
may not give what you do not own.” 
 
Q: Are you sure it’s for sale? 
A: Why else would it have a for sale sticker on it?1 
  
                                                                                                                 
 *  Visiting Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law; LL.M. Taxation, University of 
Washington School of Law (2000); J.D., J. Reuben Clark School of Law, Brigham Young University 
(1994); B.S., Brigham Young University (1988). My thanks for the superlative research assistance 
provided by Devin Arnold and Brittany Weaver. I gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the 
Texas Tech University School of Law in the preparation of this article. 
 1. See Gabriel Cohen, For You, Half Price, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2005, at Q4. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Let’s start with a story about the Eiffel Tower and Victor Lustig: 
In May of 1925, Lustig traveled to Paris with Dapper Dan 
Collins, another confidence man. While reading the newspaper 
one afternoon, Lustig noticed a small article in the paper that 
claimed that the Eiffel Tower was in great need of repair. The 
cost of the repair job was very prohibitive and there was a brief 
comment that the government was actually exploring the idea 
that it might be cheaper to rip it down than to repair it. 
Ding! 
A bell went off in Lustig’s head. He decided that he would be 
the one to sell the rights to tear down the tower. First, he had a 
counterfeiter create official government stationary and 
personally “appointed” himself to the official position of Deputy 
Director General of the Ministère de Postes et Télégraphes. 
Then, letters were sent on the official letterhead to five different 
scrap iron dealers. The letters were purposefully vague and 
simply invited them to his hotel suite to discuss a possible 
government contract. 
After entertaining these men for a bit at the hotel, Lustig made 
the surprise announcement that the government was indeed 
scrapping the Eiffel Tower. He noted that the tower had been 
built in 1889 and was never intended to be a permanent structure. 
He was careful to stress that this was a very controversial 
decision on the government’s part, so the men had to keep quiet 
regarding the tower’s demise or risk public outcry. 
Four days later, all of the dealers submitted their bids. But, 
Lustig really didn’t care who offered the highest bid, only who 
was the best mark. The Count had already chosen a man named 
André Poisson as the lucky victim. Lustig informed Poisson that 
he was the winner, but hinted that there was still a bit of a 
problem. He described the life of a public servant, one in which 
they were expected to dress and entertain on a lavish scale, yet 
2
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 2
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol31/iss3/2
2015] IP TRANSFERS OF NON-EXISTENT PROPERTY 525 
were paid a small pittance. Poisson quickly realized that Lustig 
was asking for a bribe and reached in his pocket and peeled off a 
few large bills from his pocket to secure the deal. Lustig took the 
bribe and gladly accepted Poisson’s rather handsome offer for 
the tower. 
After the scheme was complete, Lustig and Dapper Dan 
quickly drove off to the haven of Austria. They made no attempt 
to hide themselves and lived the life of luxury at Poisson’s 
expense. Each day, Lustig checked the Paris newspapers for 
news of the rip-off. But it was to never happen. Lustig concluded 
that Poisson was too embarrassed for falling into Lustig’s trap 
and had decided to eat his loss. Lustig knew he was in the clear 
and headed back to Paris and pulled the same exact scam with 
five different scrap iron dealers.2 
In discussing property, or at least the type of property that is 
tangible, we sometimes confront the situation where the seller does 
not actually own the property that he is trying to sell. This may be 
due to fraud, a mistake (either on the part of the parties or on the part 
of the recording system), or subsequent legal action. In any event, the 
doctrine of after acquired title serves to protect the grantee of the 
property and the recording system. 
The so-called “doctrine of after-acquired title” deals with the 
rights of a grantee (and his successors) who accepts a deed or 
other conveyance from a grantor then without title, but who 
thereafter acquires it. The problem asserts itself in many areas of 
the law: mortgages and other voluntary liens on real property, 
conveyances and voluntary liens by a married woman of her 
separate property, conveyances and liens on the homestead 
community property by the husband, rights of adverse possessors 
claiming through deeds, rights of creditors of the grantor, and the 
interrelation of rights of a purchaser as affected by the recording 
                                                                                                                 
 2. For Sale: The Eiffel Tower . . . , USELESS INFORMATION, http://www.
uselessinformation.org/lustig/index.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2015). 
3
Black: Psst! Wanna Buy a Bridge? IP Transfers of Non-Existent Property
Published by Reading Room, 2015
526 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:3 
acts.3 
The doctrine is frequently cited as estoppel—the grantor is not 
allowed to claim that she did not transfer the property on the grounds 
that she did not own it at the time.4 However, the doctrine has not 
been really applied in the context of intangible property. For 
example, it is frequently the case that a public university will have its 
employees—professors and other researchers—sign an agreement to 
transfer future inventions to the university.5 
Such was the case with Dr. Holodniy and Stanford University: 
In 1985, a small California research company called Cetus 
began to develop methods for quantifying blood-borne levels of 
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), the virus that causes 
AIDS. A Nobel Prize winning technique developed at Cetus—
polymerase chain reaction, or PCR—was an integral part of 
these efforts. . . . . 
In 1988, Cetus began to collaborate with scientists at Stanford 
University’s Department of Infectious Diseases to test the 
efficacy of new AIDS drugs. Dr. Holodniy joined Stanford as a 
research fellow in the department around that time. When he did 
so, he signed a Copyright and Patent Agreement (CPA) stating 
that he “agree[d] to assign” to Stanford his “right, title and 
interest in” inventions resulting from his employment at the 
University. 
. . . . 
. . . .Holodniy’s supervisor arranged for him to conduct 
research at Cetus to learn about PCR. As a condition of gaining 
                                                                                                                 
 3. Richard W. Hemingway, After-Acquired Title in Texas, 20 SW. L.J. 97, 98 (1966). 
 4. See e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. 
Ct. 2188, 2192 (2011) (discussing contracts that convey future inventions). 
 5. See Parker Tresemer, Best Practices for Drafting University Technology Assignment Agreements 
After Filmtec, Stanford v. Roche, and Patent Reform, 2012 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 347, 372 n.236 
(2012) (quoting Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 
2188, 2199 (2011)). Common language looks like this: “I will assign, and do hereby assign, to [insert 
university here] all rights to all inventions, copyrightable materials, computer software, semiconductor 
mask works, tangible research property, and trademarks (‘Intellectual Property’) conceived, invented, 
reduced to practice, or authored by me, either solely or jointly with others . . . .”Id. at 374. 
4
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 2
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol31/iss3/2
2015] IP TRANSFERS OF NON-EXISTENT PROPERTY 527 
access to Cetus, Holodniy was required to sign an agreement 
stating that he “will assign and do[es] hereby assign” to Cetus 
his “right, title and interest in . . . the ideas, inventions, and 
improvements” made “as a consequence of [his] access” to 
Cetus. Working with Cetus employees, Holodniy devised a PCR-
based procedure for measuring the amount of HIV in a patient’s 
blood. Upon returning to Stanford, he and other Stanford 
employees tested the procedure. 
. . . . 
Over the next few years, Stanford obtained written 
assignments of rights from the Stanford employees involved in 
refinement of the technique, including Holodniy, and filed 
several patent applications related to the procedure. Stanford 
secured three patents to the HIV measurement process. 
In 1991, Roche Molecular Systems, a company that 
specializes in diagnostic blood screening, acquired Cetus’s PCR-
related assets, including all rights Cetus had obtained through 
agreements like the VCA signed by Holodniy. After conducting 
clinical trials on the HIV quantification method developed at 
Cetus, Roche commercialized the procedure. Today, Roche’s 
HIV test “kits are used in hospitals and AIDS clinics 
worldwide.” 
. . . . 
In accordance with the Act’s requirements, Stanford notified 
NIH that it was electing to retain title to the invention and 
conferred on the Government a license to use the patented 
procedure. 
Petitioner, the Board of Trustees of Stanford University, filed 
suit against respondents (Roche), claiming that their HIV test 
kits infringed Stanford’s patents. Roche responded that 
Holodniy’s agreement with Cetus gave it co-ownership of the 
procedure, and thus Stanford lacked standing to sue it for patent 
infringement. Stanford countered that Holodniy had no rights to 
assign because the University had superior rights under the 
Bayh-Dole Act. The District Court agreed with Stanford and 
5
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held that under the Bayh-Dole Act, Holodniy had no rights to 
assign to Cetus. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
disagreed, concluding that Holodniy’s agreement with Cetus 
assigned his rights to Cetus, and thus to Roche. It also found that 
the Bayh-Dole Act did not automatically void an inventor’s 
rights in federally funded inventions. Thus, the Act did not 
extinguish Roche’s ownership interest in the invention, and 
Stanford was deprived of standing.6 
This is all well and good. The Stanford case highlighted a 
problem: what happens to competing IP transfer agreements? But 
there was a bigger problem that the court decided to gloss over. 
The District Court held that the “VCA effectively assigned 
any rights that Holodniy had in the patented invention to Cetus,” 
and thus to Roche. But because of the operation of the Bayh-
Dole Act, “Holodniy had no interest to assign.” The court 
concluded that the Bayh-Dole Act “provides that the individual 
inventor may obtain title” to a federally funded invention “only 
after the government and the contracting party have declined to 
do so.” 
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit disagreed. First, 
the court concluded that Holodniy’s initial agreement with 
Stanford in the Copyright and Patent Agreement constituted a 
mere promise to assign rights in the future, unlike Holodniy’s 
agreement with Cetus in the Visitor’s Confidentiality 
Agreement, which itself assigned Holodniy’s rights in the 
invention to Cetus. Therefore, as a matter of contract law, Cetus 
obtained Holodniy’s rights in the HIV quantification technique 
through the VCA. Next, the court explained that the Bayh-Dole 
Act “does not automatically void ab initio the inventors’ rights in 
government-funded inventions” and that the “statutory scheme 
did not automatically void the patent rights that Cetus received 
from Holodniy.” The court held that “Roche possesse[d] an 
                                                                                                                 
 6. Leland Stanford, 131 S. Ct. at 2189, 2192 (citations omitted). 
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ownership interest in the patents-in-suit . . . .”7 
Holodniy signed the agreement with Stanford in 1988, and the 
agreement with Cetus in 1989.8 Stanford did not apply for the patents 
until 1992, and they were granted in 1999, 2003, and 2006.9 Do any 
of the agreements have any legal force? 
This article will address the question of whether an inventor may 
transfer rights to patents that have yet to be developed, and will 
review the jurisprudence surrounding the question of transfers of 
future intangible property generally.10 It will conclude that the 
Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court have abandoned centuries of 
good precedent for no rational reason, and have created a legal mess 
in an attempt to “streamline” IP transfers.11 Finally, the article will 
highlight some of the difficult questions now raised by the Stanford 
case.12 
II.   BASIC PRINCIPLES 
“Nemo plus juris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse habet”—
No one can transfer to another any greater right than he himself has.13 
The assignee typically does not receive greater rights than the 
assignor.14 This concept has taken root in a number of different 
contexts, including the bankruptcy code: 
[Although section 541] will include choses in action and 
claims by the debtor against others, it is not intended to expand 
the debtor’s rights against others more than they exist at the 
commencement of the case. For example, if the debtor has a 
                                                                                                                 
 7. Id. at 2194 (citations omitted). 
 8. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., C 05-04158 MHP, 
2007 WL 608009 at *2, *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2007). 
 9. Id. at *6. 
 10. See discussion infra Part II. 
 11. See discussion infra Part III. 
 12. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 13. Wasserman v. Metzger, 54 S.E. 893, 895 (Va. 1906); see also Ventress v. Smith, 35 U.S. 161, 
175 (1836). 
 14. Wasserman, 54 S.E. at 895. 
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claim that is barred at the time of the commencement of the case 
by the statute of limitations, then the trustee would not be able to 
pursue that claim, because he too would be barred. He could take 
no greater rights than the debtor himself had.15 
Absent the tinkering of the Supreme Court in Stanford, Roche 
would have lost, by application of the doctrine of “he who was first 
in time was first in right.”16 Since both Cetus and Stanford’s claims 
came from the inventor and both arose before the patent came into 
being, we would classify both interests as equitable,17 and award the 
patent to Stanford. 
In Adams’ Equity (6th Amer. ed.), in which are collected 
numerous authorities, it is said: “The prevailing doctrine in the 
United States is, that the purchaser of an equitable title takes it 
subject to all prior equities.” And the same author, referring to 
the leading case of Bassett v. Nosworthy, says: “It appears to be 
clear, upon the authorities both in this country and in England, 
that among equal equities the prior in time, whether it be original 
or intermediate, is the prior in right.”18 
With this understanding, we need to ask if Dr. Holodniy was the 
original title owner? 
A.   What Does an Inventor Own? 
“Our precedents confirm the general rule that rights in an invention 
belong to the inventor.”19 
                                                                                                                 
 15. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 367–68 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6323; S. REP. 
NO. 95-989, at 82 (1978). 
 16. See Palmer v. R.R. Comm’n, 138 P. 997, 1000 (Cal. 1914). 
 17. Were both equitable? Under normal common law principles, yes, a transfer of a patent that does 
not yet exist is treated as an assignment, and is an equitable transfer. However, the Court’s opinion does 
not treat both as equitable, but it is a good place to start. 
 18. Briscoe v. Ashby, 24 Va. (1 Gratt.) 454, 477 (1874) (citations omitted). 
 19. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2188, 
2195 (2011). 
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In the U.S. IP system, we accord first rights to an inventor, even if 
that person is employed by an entity that provides him or her with the 
means to invent.20 “It is equally well established that an inventor can 
assign his rights in an invention to a third party.”21 In fact, we require 
a positive transfer for patent rights to vest in someone other than the 
inventor, even in hired-to-invent cases.22 
Employers have argued that this arrangement places a burden on 
them to police their employees and to require patent transfer 
agreements upon employment.23 This argument is sound. 
The Bayh-Dole Act was designed to free up federally funded 
research so that it could be more readily moved into the 
marketplace.24 The Act reinforced the concept that the inventor owns 
the patent, regardless of what funds or resources the inventor used in 
reducing the patent to practice or in researching the underlying 
science.25 Only an individual or individuals may apply for patent 
protection; thus, no businesses or entities may apply.26 
A U.S. patent application must be filed in the name of the 
inventors because of the intellectual property clause of the United 
States Constitution, which states, “The Congress shall have 
power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
                                                                                                                 
 20. But see Joshua Simmons, Inventions Made for Hire, 2 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 1, 12–
14 (2012) (discussing shop rights and the hired-to-invent doctrine). 
 21. Leland Stanford, 131 S. Ct. at 2195 (citing United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 
178, 187 (1933)). 
 22. Id. (“[U]nless there is an agreement to the contrary, an employer does not have rights in an 
invention ‘which is the original conception of the employee alone.’”) (quoting United States v. Dubilier 
Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 189 (1933)). “In most circumstances, an inventor must expressly grant 
his rights in an invention to his employer if the employer is to obtain those rights.” Id. 
 23. Id. (“Stanford and the United States as amicus curiae contend that the Bayh-Dole Act reorders 
the normal priority of rights in an invention when the invention is conceived or first reduced to practice 
with the support of federal funds. In their view, the Act moves inventors from the front of the line to the 
back by vesting title to federally funded inventions in the inventor’s employer—the federal contractor.” 
(emphasis in original) (citing Brief for Petitioner at 26–27, and Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner at 6, Leland Stanford (No. 09-1159))). 
 24. Id. at 2201. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Patent Ownership Basics, NEUSTEL LAW OFFICES, http://www.neustel.com/Patent-
Ownership/Patent-Ownership-Basics.aspx (last visited Jan. 19, 2015) (“It should be noted that a 
company can never be an inventor.”). 
9
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securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”27 
Among competing inventors, “[p]riority goes to the first party to 
reduce an invention to practice unless the other party can show that it 
was the first to conceive the invention and that it exercised 
reasonable diligence in later reducing that invention to practice.”28 
“Conception” is itself a term of art, and refers to “a definite and 
permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is 
hereafter to be applied in practice.”29 All of this leads to the 
conclusion that the U.S. patent system is very much focused on 
individual inventors. 
Universities, corporations, and other entities that desire to obtain 
ownership of the IP that their employees create must do so through 
the mechanism of patent assignments.30 This brings us back to the 
argument that granting first rights to the individual inventor places a 
burden on employers to police their employees and to require patent 
transfer agreements upon employment. 
B.   Assignments Are Equitable Transfers 
Although a chose in action is defined as personal rights that can be 
claimed by action,31 it has never been quite clear whether patents fall 
into this category. On the one hand, patents are choses: 
“ALL personal things are either in possession or action. The 
law knows no tertium quid between the two.” It follows from 
this that the category of choses in action is in English law 
enormously wide, and that it can only be defined in very general 
terms. . . . In its primary sense the term “chose in action” 
includes all rights which are enforceable by action—rights to 
                                                                                                                 
 27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1–8 (emphasis added). 
 28. Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 29. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (internal 
quotations omitted); see also Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 30. See Leland Stanford, 131 S. Ct. at 2203 (citing United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 
U.S. 178, 187 (1933)). 
 31. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 101 (9th ed. 2009). 
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debts of all kinds, and rights of action on a contract or a right to 
damages for its breach; rights arising by reason of the 
commission of tort or other wrong; and rights to recover the 
ownership or possession of property real or personal. It was 
extended to cover the documents, such as bonds, which 
evidenced or proved the existence of such rights of action. This 
led to the inclusion in this class of things of such instruments as 
bills, notes, cheques, shares in companies, stock in the public 
funds, bills of lading, and policies of insurance. But many of 
these documents were in effect documents of title to what was in 
substance an incorporeal right of property. Hence it was not 
difficult to include in this category things which were even more 
obviously property of an incorporeal type, such as patent rights 
and copyrights.32 
However, because of the peculiar nature of the patent monopoly, it 
does not always behave like other choses: 
It is said that the claim of an owner of a patent for damages 
for infringement is only a chose in action which in modern days 
may be so assigned that the assignee acquires full title and the 
right to sue at law as well as in equity without joining his 
assignor. This view ignores the peculiar character of patent 
property and the recognized rules for the transfer of its 
ownership and its incidents. Patent property is the creature of 
statute law and its incidents are equally so and depend upon the 
construction to be given to the statutes creating it and them, in 
view of the policy of Congress in their enactment. This is shown 
by the opinion of this Court in Waterman v. MacKenzie . . . . It is 
not safe, therefore, in dealing with a transfer of rights under the 
patent law, to follow implicitly the rules governing a transfer of 
                                                                                                                 
 32. W. S. Holdsworth, The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law, 33 
HARV. L. REV. 997, 997–98 (1920) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). 
11
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rights in a chose in action at common law.33 
In fact, some courts have focused on the nature of what the 
plaintiff has or possesses, rather than on the right of action,34 while 
other courts sweep all rights into the category.35 
Why does this matter? The assignment of a chose in action or the 
ability to pursue rights through a cause of action depended upon 
equity, not the law. As a result, all assignments (and what title they 
“conveyed”) were equitable in nature. 
Equitable title, in turn, brings with it a host of doctrines that do not 
apply to legal title.36 
The principle underlying this doctrine is stated as follows, in 
Briscoe v. Ashby, supra: “The reason of the distinction between 
the purchaser of a legal and an equitable interest seems to be that 
the protection accorded to bona fide purchasers is a departure 
from the general rule of jurisprudence, which holds that no man 
can transfer a greater right than he possesses, and regards the 
vendee as standing in the same position as the vendor under 
whom he claims. This exception was made in equity against the 
rights and remedies which it had called into being, and in favor 
of purchasers who bought in good faith and under the impression 
that they were acquiring the legal title. But when the purchase is 
of a mere equity which owes its existence to a court of chancery 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24, 40 (1923) (citations omitted). 
 34. Pan Am. Prod. Co v. United Lands Co., 96 F.2d 26, 27 (5th Cir. 1938) (“The phrase ‘chose in 
action’ is the antithesis of chose in possession and refers to a right to money or other personal property 
which is not in hand and can be reached and enjoyed only by an action. It is sometimes applied to the 
paper evidencing the right, as a note, bond, stock certificate or executory contract. The plaintiff here is 
not seeking to recover anything, but only to protect what he has. He is in possession. If his right is a 
chose, it is a chose in possession. He is trying to protect property in his possession and enjoyment, and 
not to recover upon a chose in action.”). 
 35. Brown v. Fletcher, 235 U.S. 589, 595–96 (1915) (“‘[A] chose in action embraces in one sense all 
rights of action.’”) (quoting Dundas v. Bowler, 8 Fed. Cas. 28, 29 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No. 4141)). 
 36. Wasserman v. Metzger, 54 S.E. 893, 895, 905 (Va. 1906). Notable doctrines that do not apply to 
legal title include: (1) Nemo plus juris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse habet (one may only 
transfer what one owns), (2) Qui prior est in tempore potior est in jure (where two equities are equal the 
prior equity shall prevail), and (3) equitable title negates the bona fide purchaser rule. Id.; Briscoe v. 
Ashby, 65 Va. (24 Gratt.) 454, 475–76 (1874). 
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and cannot be enforced without its assistance, the reasons for 
departing from the general maxim, ‘Nemo plus juris ad alium 
transferre potest quam ipse habet,’ is at an end, and the right 
acquired by the vendee is limited to that of the vendor. When, 
therefore, a purchaser buys an equitable estate or interest with a 
knowledge of its real character, and without obtaining a legal 
title, he can found no claim on the mere fact of the purchase and 
must stand or fall by the title of his vendor. So it was declared in 
the most unequivocal manner by [Chief Justice] Marshall, in 
Shirras v. Caig that the purchaser of an equitable title takes it 
subject to all existing equities. . . . In Chew v. Barnett, [Chief 
Justice] Gibson said: “When it is asserted that a purchaser for 
valuable consideration takes the title free of every trust or equity 
of which he has no notice, it is intended of a title perfect on its 
face; for every purchaser of an imperfect title takes it with all its 
imperfections on its head. It is his own fault that he confides in a 
title which appears defective to his own eyes, and he does so at 
his peril. Now, every equitable title is incomplete on its face. It is 
in truth nothing more than a title to go into chancery to have the 
legal estate conveyed, and therefore every purchaser of a mere 
equity takes it subject to any clog that may lie on it, whether he 
has notice or not.”37 
The Briscoe case dealt with the purchase of land by third parties 
from a trustee who never acquired legal title.38 When they learned of 
the sale, the beneficiaries complained that the third parties could not 
be bona fide purchasers: 
The appellant in this case cannot put himself in the high 
position of a purchaser for valuable consideration without notice. 
This court has settled that question against him. In the case of 
Mutual Assurance Society v. Stone and others, President Tucker 
says: “The rule is unquestionable, that he who would protect 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Wasserman, 54 S.E. at 895 (citations omitted). 
 38. See generally Briscoe, 65 Va. (24 Gratt.) 454. 
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himself as a purchaser without notice must show himself to be a 
complete purchaser. If, therefore, either his purchase money 
remains unpaid, or he has not completed his title by obtaining a 
conveyance before he has received notice, the notice will affect 
him; for if he receive that notice before both of those acts are 
perfected, he ought to stop until the equity is enquired into, or he 
will be bound by it. Thus, although he has paid every cent of his 
purchase money, and the hopeless insolvency of his vendor 
would prevent his ever recovering it back, yet, if he has not 
completed his title by getting a conveyance prior to his notice of 
the prior equity he must stop, and will not be permitted to go on 
to secure himself by obtaining the legal title from the common 
vendor. And this is in strict consonance with justice and in strict 
analogy with equitable principles. It rests upon the maxim, 
which prevails in equity as well as at law, Qui prior est in 
tempore potior est in jure, where two equities are equal the prior 
equity shall prevail.”39 
The Federal Circuit had a confused opinion about the legal versus 
equitable nature of assignments. “While Stanford might have gained 
certain equitable rights against Holodniy, Stanford did not 
immediately gain title to Holodniy’s inventions as a result of the 
CPA, nor at the time the inventions were created.”40 Immediately 
after, the Federal Circuit treated Holodniy’s second assignment as 
granting something more: “Therefore, Cetus immediately gained 
equitable title to Holodniy’s inventions.”41 
Regardless of the strange nomenclature, two equitable claims 
should have been resolved using the first in time, first in right rule. 
Cetus knew or should have known of Stanford’s prior claim and 
contract with Dr. Holodniy, and this should not have been a hard 
case. 
Justice Breyer’s dissent recognizes this: 
                                                                                                                 
 39. Id. at 475–76 (citations omitted). 
 40. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 583 F.3d 832, 
841–42 (Fed. Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011). 
 41. Id. at 842 (citation omitted). 
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Dr. Holodniy executed his agreement with Stanford in 1988. 
At that time, patent law appears to have long specified that a 
present assignment of future inventions (as in both contracts 
here) conveyed equitable, but not legal, title. See, e.g., G. Curtis, 
A Treatise on the Law of Patents for Useful Inventions § 170, p. 
155 (3d ed. 1867) (“A contract to convey a future 
invention . . . cannot alone authorize a patent to be taken by the 
party in whose favor such a contract was intended to operate”); 
Comment, Contract Rights as Commercial Security: Present and 
Future Intangibles, 67 Yale L.J. 847, 854, n. 27 (1958) (“The 
rule generally applicable grants equitable enforcement to an 
assignment of an expectancy but demands a further act, either 
reduction to possession or further assignment of the right when it 
comes into existence”). 
Under this rule, both the initial Stanford and later Cetus 
agreements would have given rise only to equitable interests in 
Dr. Holodniy’s invention. And as between these two claims in 
equity, the facts that Stanford’s contract came first and that 
Stanford subsequently obtained a postinvention assignment as 
well should have meant that Stanford, not Cetus, would receive 
the rights its contract conveyed. 
In 1991, however, the Federal Circuit, in FilmTec, adopted the 
new rule quoted above—a rule that distinguishes between these 
equitable claims and, in effect, says that Cetus must win. The 
Federal Circuit provided no explanation for what seems a 
significant change in the law.42 
To examine how this change in the law happened, we turn next to 
the Federal Circuit’s decision in FilmTec.43 
                                                                                                                 
 42. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2188, 
2203 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 43. See infra Part II.C. 
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C.   FilmTec 
FilmTec was founded by John Cadotte and three others in 1977.44 
Before founding FilmTec, they were employed by Midwest Research 
Institute (MRI), which was a non-profit research organization that, 
among other projects, developed reverse osmosis membranes.45 
MRI had a contract with the federal government, which provided 
that MRI agreed to “grant and does hereby grant to the Government 
the full and entire domestic right, title and interest in [any invention, 
discovery, improvement or development (whether or not patentable) 
made in the course of or under this contract or any subcontract (of 
any tier) thereunder].”46 
Cadotte submitted a patent application in February of 1979.47 He 
left MRI in January of 1978.48 At trial Cadotte testified that he 
developed the idea for his invention a month after leaving MRI.49 
However, Allied disputed this, alleging Cadotte actually formed the 
reverse osmosis membrane of [patent 4,277,344 (‘344 patent)] 
earlier.50 Allied claimed Cadotte’s invention was conceived in July 
1977 or at least by November 1977 when he purportedly introduced 
an improved membrane.51 Allied based this on Cadotte’s notebook 
entries kept during this period.52 “The trial judge found that 
‘Cadotte’s 1977 North Star notebook entries establish that he did 
[while still at MRI] combine the two chemicals which are claimed in 
the ‘344 patent.’”53 
FilmTec subsequently filed an infringement action against Allied, 
and Allied claimed that because the MRI contract vested title in the 
government, FilmTec did not have standing to sue.54 The district 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Filmtec Corp. v. Allied-Signal Inc., 939 F.2d 1568, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1991), vacated sub nom. 
Filmtec Corp. v. Hydranautics, 982 F.2d 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Filmtec Corp., 939 F.2d at 1570. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 1571. 
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court granted a preliminary injunction against Allied, concluding, as 
a matter of law, Allied could not raise title as a defense because 
under the contract the government would have no more than 
equitable title to the patent.55 Supporting its findings, the court stated 
“that the [g]overnment’s rights in an invention discovered by an 
employee while under contract are equitable, and are not available as 
a defense by the alleged infringer against the legal titleholder.”56 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit made two observations. First, the 
court cited Gayler v. Wilder to support its finding that “it is settled 
law that between the time of an invention and the issuance of a 
patent, rights in an invention may be assigned and legal title to the 
ensuing patent will pass to the assignee upon grant of the patent.”57 
Second, the court cited Mitchell v. Winslow explaining “[i]f an 
assignment of rights in an invention is made prior to the existence of 
the invention, this may be viewed as an assignment of an expectant 
interest.”58 This expectant interest can be validly assigned, but at 
most allows an assignee to hold equitable title.59 We will look at each 
observation in turn. 
1. Transfers Post-Invention but Pre-Patent 
In 1839, Daniel Fitzgerald came up with a way to make a fireproof 
safe, which he called a “Salamander safe.”60 That same year, he 
agreed to transfer to Enos Wilder all rights he had, including the 
forthcoming patent, for $5,000.61 
‘Whereas I, Daniel Fitzgerald, of the city, county, and State of 
New York, have invented certain improvements in safes, which 
invention I call the ‘Salamander safe,’ for which I am about to 
make application for letters patent of United States: And whereas 
                                                                                                                 
 55. Id. at 1570. 
 56. Filmtec Corp., 939 F.2d at 1570. 
 57. Id. at 1572 (citing Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. 477, 493 (1850)). 
 58. Id. (citing Mitchell v. Winslow, 17 F. Cas. 527, 531–32 (C.C.D. Me. 1843)). 
 59. Id. (citing Mitchell v. Winslow, 17 F. Cas. 527, 531–32 (C.C.D. Me. 1843)). 
 60. Gayler, 51 U.S. at 478. 
 61. Id. at 479–80. 
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E. Wilder, of New York aforesaid, has agreed to purchase from 
me all right and title, and interest which I have, or may have, in 
and to the said invention, in consequence of the grant of letters 
patent therefor, and has paid to me, the said Fitzgerald, the sum 
of five thousand dollars, the receipt whereof is hereby 
acknowledged: 
‘Now, this indenture witnesseth, that, for and in consideration 
of the said sum to me paid, I have assigned and transferred to E. 
Wilder aforesaid the full and exclusive right to all the 
improvements made by me, as fully set forth and described in the 
specification which I have prepared and executed preparatory to 
obtaining letters patent therefor. And I hereby authorize and 
request the Commissioner of Patents to issue the said letters 
patent to the said E. Wilder and his legal representatives.62 
The patent did not issue until 1843.63 There was no other 
assignment, and the plaintiff sued Gayler and Brown for alleged 
infringement of the patent.64 
Justice Taney, speaking for the Court, said, “The inventor of a new 
and useful improvement certainly has no exclusive right to it, until he 
obtains a patent. This right is created by the patent, and no suit can be 
maintained by the inventor against any one for using it before the 
patent is issued.”65 
However, the Court did recognize an inventor’s “inchoate right” to 
the use of his invention, which he may seek to patent.66 The Court 
found that the assignment by Fitzgerald contemplated the transfer of 
both the inchoate right and the forthcoming patent.67 The 
assignment’s language indicated that it would operate on both 
Fitzgerald’s perfect legal title and “imperfect and inchoate interest 
                                                                                                                 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 481. 
 64. Id. at 502 (Daniel, J., dissenting) (explaining the plaintiff received his “assignment from B. G. 
Wilder, assignee of Enos Wilder, assignee of Daniel Fitzgerald, alleged to have been the inventor of the 
Salamander safe”). 
 65. Id at 493. 
 66. Gayler, 51 U.S. at 493. 
 67. Id. 
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which he actually possessed . . . . [T]here . . . seem[ed] to be no 
sound reason for defeating the intention of the parties by restraining 
the assignment to the latter interest, and compelling them to execute 
another transfer, unless the act of Congress makes it necessary.”68 
In fact, the Court seemed to think to do otherwise would be to 
exalt form over substance: 
And when the party has acquired an inchoate right to it, and 
the power to make that right perfect and absolute at his pleasure, 
the assignment of his whole interest, whether executed before or 
after the patent issued, is equally within the provisions of the act 
of Congress. 
And we are the less disposed to give it a different 
construction, because no purpose of justice would be answered 
by it, and the one we now give was the received construction of 
the act of 1793, in several of the circuits; and there is no material 
difference in this respect between the two acts. . . . Fitzgerald 
sets up no claim against the assignment, and to require another to 
complete the transfer would be mere form. We do not think the 
act of Congress requires it; but that, when the patent issued to 
him, the legal right to the monopoly and property it created was, 
by operation of the assignment then on record, vested in Enos 
Wilder.69 
This opinion raises several troubling issues. One is found in the 
dissent by Justice McLean. There was evidence that Fitzgerald’s safe 
was not the first one created, and that Fitzgerald was not the original 
inventor.70 If so, then his patent would be void. If the patent were 
void, what becomes of the pre-patent assignment? 
The majority opinion dealing with the efficiency of not requiring a 
second post-patent assignment, especially where Fitzgerald himself 
did not dispute that the assignment had been made, is certainly 
                                                                                                                 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 493–94. 
 70. Id. at 499. 
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appealing.71 But what the Gayler Court did not consider was the 
widespread use of patent transfer agreements in today’s society. Can 
it be said that those inventors intended to transfer future patents to 
their employers, particularly if those patents did not result in work 
that was within the scope of their employment? 
Fitzgerald knew of his impending patent application and of the 
invention he wanted to transfer.72 Is the same true of today’s 
researchers? 
A second issue is raised by the dissent of Justice Daniel, 
concerning whether the plaintiff proved that he had obtained and 
transferred a legal title to Enos Wilder.73 
A title to any specific machine which he may have 
constructed, and of which no person could rightfully deprive 
him; and a claim upon the good-will and gratitude of the 
community; if in truth he should have conferred upon them a 
benefit by the discovery and construction of his 
machine. . . . The mere mental process of devising an invention 
enters not into the nature of property according to the common 
law; it forms no class or division in any of its enumerations or 
definitions of estates or property, and is a matter quite too 
shadowy for the practical character of that sturdy system.74 
Justice Daniel continues his discussion, and asks whether the 
process of invention (the “inchoate right” spoken of by the majority) 
might be a chose in action.75 
But if the mere mental and invisible process of invention, 
apart from the specific, sensible, and individual structure, can be 
classed at all as property at law, it must partake of the character 
of a chose in action, much more so than an obligation or 
                                                                                                                 
 71. See generally id. at 477–90. 
 72. Gayler, 51 U.S. at 480. 
 73. Id. at 503. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 504. 
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contract, the terms and conditions of which are defined and 
assented to by the contracting parties. To choses in action, it can 
scarcely be necessary here to remark, assignability is imparted 
by statutory enactment only, or by commercial usage. To hold 
that the single circumstance of invention creates an estate or 
property at law, and an estate and legal title transmissible by 
assignment, appears to me a doctrine not merely subversive of 
the common law, but one which contravenes the origin and 
course of legislation in England in relation to patent rights, and 
renders useless and futile both the constitutional provision and 
all the careful enactments of Congress for the security and 
transmissibility of the same rights. . . . I hold it, then, to be true, 
that the circumstance of invention invests no such perfect estate 
or right of property as can be claimed and enforced at law or in 
equity against the user of the same invention, either by 
subsequent inventors or imitators, and that any estate or property 
in the mere mental process of invention must be traced to and 
deducible from the Constitution and the acts of Congress alone. I 
cannot but regard as mischievous and alarming an attempt to 
introduce a quasi and indefinite, indefinable, and invisible estate, 
independently of the Constitution and acts of Congress, and 
unknown to the rules and principles of the common law. 
It is the patent alone which creates an estate or interest in the 
invention known to the law, and which can be enforced either at 
law or in equity, either by the inventor or by the person to whom, 
by virtue of the statute, he may assign his rights.76 
If the inchoate interest is not an interest that can be assigned, then 
what existed in 1839 that could be transferred? “Down to the act of 
Congress of 1837, nothing but the estate, interest, or property created 
or invested by the patent itself, was made assignable.”77 
                                                                                                                 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
The language of the law is, that ‘every patent,’ ‘the exclusive right under any patent,’ ‘the 
thing patented,’ may be assignable. The fact or existence of a patent is in every instance 
inseparable from the right given. It is this fact and this only which impresses the quality 
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Justice Daniel then finishes with this: 
Yet still it is presumed that, until the issuing of a patent, so far 
is it from being true that a legal estate or title existed in such 
assignee, it is clear, on the contrary, that no legal title existed 
before the patent in the inventor himself, for it is the patent 
which constitutes his title. Of course, then, the assignee can at 
most hold nothing but an equity under such an assignment, 
which he may insist upon under this assignment against the 
inventor or against the government; but he has no legal title by 
force merely of such an assignment, and a fortiori he has no 
legal title, if the patent, notwithstanding such an assignment, is 
in fact issued to the inventor, but is thereby entirely excluded 
from all pretension to a legal title. Thus, in the case before us, 
the patent under which the plaintiff claims was, subsequently to 
the agreement between Fitzgerald and Enos Wilder, issued to 
Fitzgerald, the inventor, and, according to the proofs in the 
cause, has never been renewed to Enos Wilder, nor to any 
claimant under him, nor been assigned to any such claimant, but 
remains still in the alleged inventor, Fitzgerald. It seems to me, 
then, indisputable, that the legal title indispensable for the 
maintenance of this suit at law never was in the plaintiff, and 
that he could not maintain the action.78 
We may look at Gayler as simply a standing case and read it to 
mean that the Court will relax the issue of standing to enforce a 
patent when the plaintiff has held an equitable interest that 
subsequently could have become a legal title but for the inaction of 
the title holder, who thought he had done everything necessary to 
transfer his patent.79 
                                                                                                                 
of assignability. Of course, under these provisions there could be no transfer of the legal 
title previously to a patent. 
Id. 
 78. Gayler, 51 U.S. at 505. 
 79. See generally id. 
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The Federal Circuit in FilmTec decided that Gayler actually held 
that patents could be transferred in advance, and for that proposition 
Gayler is not as strong as the Federal Circuit wished us to believe.80 
First, such a reading is a disturbingly large departure from common 
law principles of property transfer. Second, the facts of Gayler are 
not as strong to suggest that in every case a pre-patent transfer works 
to convey legal title to an after-conceived invention.81 Third, we have 
other cases (and the dissents in Gayler itself) that would suggest that 
the law is otherwise. 
2.   Transfers Pre-Invention 
Citing Mitchell v. Winslow, the Federal Circuit in FilmTec stated, 
“In such a situation [assignment prior to invention’s existence], the 
assignee holds at most an equitable title.”82 Mitchell was a 
bankruptcy case, where George and David Ropes borrowed $15,000 
from Winslow, and in exchange gave a deed to Winslow conveying 
all their machinery in their cutlery factory and any machinery they 
may acquire in the four ensuing years.83 
Justice Story agreed that the deed was valid as to the future 
property: 
Upon the best consideration, which I am able to give the 
subject, I think it is good and valid. Courts of equity do not, like 
courts of law, confine themselves to the giving of effect to 
assignments of rights and interests, which are absolutely fixed 
and in esse. On the contrary, they support assignments, not only 
of choses in action, but of contingent interests and expectancies, 
and also of things, which have no present actual or potential 
existence, but rest in mere possibility only. In respect to the 
latter, it is true, that the assignment can have no positive 
operation to transfer, in presenti, property in things not in esse; 
                                                                                                                 
 80. Filmtec Corp. v. Allied-Signal Inc., 939 F.2d 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1991), vacated sub nom. 
Filmtec Corp. v. Hydranautics, 982 F.2d 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 81. See generally id. 
 82. Id. (citing Mitchell v. Winslow, 17 F. Cas. 527, 532 (C.C.D. Me. 1843)). 
 83. Mitchell, 17 F. Cas. at 529. 
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but it operates by way of present contract, to take effect and 
attach to the things assigned, when and as soon as they some in 
esse; and it may be enforced as such a contract in rem, in equity. 
Lord Hardwicke, in Wright v. Wright, expressly recognised this 
doctrine; and said, that an assignment of a contingent interest or 
possibility of an inheritance was equally allowable with an 
assignment of a possibility of a personal thing or chattel real. 
And he added: ‘An assignment always operates by way of 
agreement or contract, amounting in the consideration of this 
court, to this, that one agrees with another to transfer, and make 
good that right or interest, which is made good here by way of 
agreement.’ In the very case, then before him, he admitted, that 
the assignor had no immediate claim or demand, but a mere 
possibility in the property assigned, and that it was well assigned 
by the word ‘claim,’ which well described it, in presenti and in 
futuro.84 
But note the qualifications. First, this was a bankruptcy case, so 
the balancing analysis the court performs would be different from a 
patent case. Second, the court recognized that transfers of future 
assets must be equitable interests, and that they needed to be 
accompanied by a claim (and were not “automatic”).85 
Justice Story then proceeded to examine other cases, with subject 
matter including:86 
 
 Escrow (promises to convey land in the future) 
 Transfers of future inheritances (including 
bankruptcy) 
 Transfers of the freight of a future voyage 
 Present and future earnings of a ship 
 Assignments of the wool growing on the backs of 
the sheep (the future fleeces were not assignable) 
                                                                                                                 
 84. Id. at 531 (citations omitted). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 531–32. 
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 Assignments of freights earned and to be earned on 
an outward and homeward voyage 
 Mortgages made of a whale ship, her tackle, 
appurtenances, all oil, head matter, and other cargo, 
which might be caught and brought home in the 
ship on and from her then present voyage 
 Tenants who contract for particular things on the 
property when the term of his occupation expires, 
which become the property of the lessor at a certain 
price or at a price to be determined in a certain 
manner (a contract to sell property not then 
belonging to the vendor. which a court of equity 
will enforce) 
 Mines, where the lessee has agreed to leave engines 
and machinery not annexed to the freehold which 
shall be on the property at the expiration of the lease 
to be paid for at a valuation 
 
The court concluded that “non-existing property may be the 
subject of valid assignment.”87 However, that is not the same as 
saying that all purported transfers of non-existing property are valid. 
The court did recognize that a transferor may agree to transfer non-
existing property, but that the transferee only receives an equitable 
interest.88 
Note that the Federal Circuit did not cite any authority for its 
statement that “once the invention is made and an application for 
patent is filed, however, legal title to the rights accruing thereunder 
would be in the assignee.”89 This was not a correct statement of the 
law, as has been discussed above. 
The purported assignment pursuant to MRI’s government contract 
would have occurred prior to the transfer of the patent to FilmTec.90 
                                                                                                                 
 87. Id. at 532. 
 88. Id. at 533. 
 89. Filmtec Corp. v. Allied-Signal Inc., 939 F.2d 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1991), vacated sub nom. 
Filmtec Corp. v. Hydranautics, 982 F.2d 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 90. Id. at 1573. 
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It is not clear from the record whether that would have been an 
assignment pre- or post-invention. 
In this case, if Cadotte granted MRI rights in inventions made 
during his employ, and if the subject matter of the ‘344 patent 
was invented by Cadotte during his employ with MRI, then 
Cadotte had nothing to give to FilmTec and his purported 
assignment to FilmTec is a nullity. Thus, FilmTec would lack 
both title to the ‘344 patent and standing to bring the present 
action.91 
This is because the Federal Circuit believed that “the contract 
between MRI and the Government . . . expressly granted to the 
Government MRI’s rights in any future invention. Ordinarily, no 
further act would be required once an invention came into being; the 
transfer of title would occur by operation of law.”92 
The FilmTec court then addressed FilmTec’s claim that it was a 
bona fide purchaser. “It is well established that when a legal title 
holder of a patent transfers his or her title to a third party purchaser 
for value without notice of an outstanding equitable claim or title, the 
purchaser takes the entire ownership of the patent, free of any prior 
equitable encumbrance.”93 
Note, however, that for Cadotte to be a legal title holder capable of 
transferring his patent to FilmTec, there could not have been a 
transfer to the government, since that would have occurred by 
operation of law, leaving Cadotte with “nothing to give to 
FilmTec.”94 
This clouding of the issue involving the bona fide purchaser rule 
and equitable title in patents transferred before the issuance of such a 
patent generated a lot of confusion.95 
                                                                                                                 
 91. Id. at 1572 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1988)). 
 92. Id. at 1573. 
 93. Id. (quoting Hendrie v. Sayles, 98 U.S. 546, 549 (1879)). 
 94. Id. at 1572. 
 95. Sean M. O’Connor, The Aftermath of Stanford v. Roche: Which Law of Assignments Governs?, 
24 INTELL. PROP. J. 29, 37 (2011). The following explains the confusion: 
The FilmTec court did not state whether it was basing its decision on an application of 
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While a “United States patent is a federal legal right, ownership of 
the patent is determined under the relevant state law. However, 
changes in patent ownership are recorded with the U.S. Patent & 
Trademark Office to place the public on notice of ownership interests 
in the patent.”96 
The concurring and dissenting Supreme Court justices in 
Stanford seemed concerned as to both the rule that federal 
common law governs invention assignment agreements and that 
rule’s distinction between assignments of future interests and 
obligations to assign. Their concern appears rooted in how 
Stanford lost control of Holodniy’s rights and potentially 
jeopardized the Government’s rights in the invention. But, when 
Holodniy executed the CPA, FilmTec had not been decided and 
some attorneys in California may have believed that state’s 
contract law provided that obligations to assign—under the 
“agree to assign” language—effected an immediate transfer just 
as present conveyances of future interests—under the “hereby 
assign”—did.97 
In any event, we should remember that Filmtec involved an appeal 
from a preliminary injunction granted to Filmtec against Allied.98 
That meant that on appeal, the court was looking at the facts in the 
light most favorable to Allied.99 
This was because in granting the preliminary injunction, the 
trial court concluded that as a matter of law even if the invention 
was made while Cadotte was employed at MRI, under the 
                                                                                                                 
state law—which normally governs contract law interpretation—or establishing a rule of 
federal common law. This remained murky though later decisions, until the 2008 decision 
in DDB Technologies, L.L.C. v. MLB Advanced Media, L.P. In that case, the Federal 
Circuit squarely held that invention assignment agreements are governed by federal 
common law because they are integral to the question of standing in federal patent cases. 
Id. 
 96. Patent Ownership Basics, supra note 26. 
 97. O’Connor, supra note 95. 
 98. Filmtec Corp., 939 F.2d at 1571. 
 99. Id. 
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contract the Government could have no more than equitable title 
to the patent, which title cannot be raised as a defense by Allied. 
The district court stated “that the [G]overnment’s rights in an 
invention discovered by an employee while under contract are 
equitable, and are not available as a defense by the alleged 
infringer against the legal titleholder. 
. . . . 
It is well settled in this court that a party seeking a preliminary 
injunction “must establish a right thereto in light of four factors: 
1) a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits . . . .” 
We address first the question of title to the ‘344 patent. 
Because of its central importance to the resolution of this case, 
we requested and received supplemental briefing from the parties 
with regard to this issue. It is important to keep in mind that the 
issue before us is not who should ultimately be held to have title 
to the patent, but whether, in view of the state of the title, it can 
be said that FilmTec has a reasonable likelihood of success on 
the merits of that issue, sufficient to warrant the grant of the 
preliminary injunction.100 
In ordering a remand, the Federal Circuit focused on two issues. 
First, the transfer to Filmtec must have been for bona fide 
consideration.101 That may have been a real issue if the actual transfer 
of the patent never happened or was dealt with in a less than formal 
manner.102 
Second, to qualify as a bona fide purchaser, Filmtec, which was 
formed by the inventor of the patent, must have been without notice 
of prior purchasers.103 The court decided that Filmtec would be 
charged with the knowledge that the inventor had, and since the 
                                                                                                                 
 100. Id. at 1570–71 (quoting Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Auto Body Panels of Ohio, 908 F.2d 951, 952 
(Fed. Cir. 1990)). 
 101. Id. at 1574. 
 102. Id. However, the record states, “Cadotte assigned his rights in the application and any 
subsequently issuing patent to plaintiff-appellee FilmTec Corp. (FilmTec). This assignment was duly 
recorded in the United States Patent and Trademark Office.” Id. at 1570. 
 103. Id. at 1574. 
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inventor had signed the agreement transferring his rights to the 
Government, Filmtec was not in the dark.104 
Subject to the provisions of this title, patents shall have the 
attributes of personal property. 
 . . . 
Applications for patent, patents, or any interest therein, shall 
be assignable in law by an instrument in writing. The applicant, 
patentee, or his assigns or legal representatives may in like 
manner grant and convey an exclusive right under his application 
for patent, or patents, to the whole or any specified part of the 
United States. 
A certificate of acknowledgment under the hand and official 
seal of a person authorized to administer oaths within the United 
States, or, in a foreign country, of a diplomatic or consular 
officer of the United States or an officer authorized to administer 
oaths whose authority is proved by a certificate of a diplomatic 
or consular officer of the United States, or apostille of an official 
designated by a foreign country which, by treaty or convention, 
accords like effect to apostilles of designated officials in the 
United States, shall be prima facie evidence of the execution of 
an assignment, grant or conveyance of a patent or application for 
patent. 
An interest that constitutes an assignment, grant or 
conveyance shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser or 
mortgagee for a valuable consideration, without notice, unless it 
is recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office within three 
months from its date or prior to the date of such subsequent 
purchase or mortgage.105 
So, Filmtec is right on the law of competing equities, since it could 
not claim to obtain a good title if it knew of the prior transfers. In the 
Stanford case, the competing equities claim would favor Stanford 
                                                                                                                 
 104. Filmtec Corp., 939 F.2d at 1574. 
 105. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012). 
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since Dr. Holodniy’s prior agreement was with Stanford (this would 
be the case with most university researchers).106 In fact, the argument 
could be made that Cetus was at least on inquiry notice with respect 
to the fact that Dr. Holodniy was visiting them from Stanford, and 
any reasonable player in the field would know (or be on inquiry 
notice to determine) that Stanford employees are required to have 
signed a CDA. 
But Filmtec is also horribly wrong on the law that it is frequently 
cited for, which is that federal common law holds that the transfer 
becomes complete upon the issuance of the patent.107 Prior to 
Filmtec, there was no such law. In fact, the “common law” quite 
clearly holds just the opposite—that purported transfers of IP not yet 
in existence can convey, at best, an equitable interest in the IP when 
(and if!) it comes into being.108 
The Ninth Circuit, while addressing this very issue, held: 
The case of Littlefield v. Perry is cited in support of this 
doctrine. This case is very different from the one in hand. There 
the patentee had assigned a subsisting patent, with all future 
improvements thereon. Subsequently he made and patented an 
improvement on the same, and used it without the consent of his 
assignee. The assignee sued for infringement, and the court held 
the assignor was estopped by his deed. The case arose between 
the assignee and the patentee, and not two persons claiming to be 
the assignees of the same thing. Between the two cases there is 
no analogy.109 
D.   DDB 
David Barstow and his brother Daniel formed DDB to 
commercialize patents relating to a method for generating a computer 
                                                                                                                 
 106. O’Connor, supra note 95, at 29. 
 107. See Filmtec, 939 F.2d at 1573 (citing Hendrie v. Sayles, 98 U.S. 546, 549 (1879)). 
 108. Sangeeta Puran, Assigning Rights in Future Inventions: The U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in 
Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University v. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc., 47 J. 
LICENSING EXEC. SOC’Y INT’L 206, 206 (2012). 
 109. Regan Vapor-Engine Co. v. Pac. Gas-Engine Co., 49 F. 68, 70 (9th Cir. 1892) (citation omitted). 
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simulation of a live event for display on a viewer’s computer.110 
David, a computer scientist, worked for Schlumberger Technology 
Corporation from 1980 until 1994.111 At the start of his employment, 
he entered into an employment agreement that provided that he 
would disclose to his employer any ideas that he might have during 
his employment.112 The employment agreement included the 
following provision: 
Employee agrees to and does hereby grant and assign to 
Company or its nominee his entire right, title and interest in and 
to ideas, inventions and improvements coming within the scope 
of Paragraph 3: a) which relate in any way to the business or 
activities of [Schlumberger], or b) which are suggested by or 
result from any task or work of Employee for [Schlumberger], or 
c) which relate in any way to the business or activities of 
Affiliates of [Schlumberger], together with any and all domestic 
and foreign patent rights in such ideas, inventions and 
improvements.113 
During his employment with Schlumberger, David worked on 
software that processed data collected by sensors monitoring oil 
wells, and on other software development projects.114 He also worked 
on personal projects, including collaborating with his brother Daniel 
on software that would have collected information about a live event, 
such as a baseball game, and then would have relayed a simulation of 
that event to users’ computers.115 That collaboration led to the 
applications for patents, two of which were filed and one of which 
was issued during David’s employment with Schlumberger.116 Those 
patents were assigned to DDB.117 
                                                                                                                 
 110. DDB Techs., L.L.C. v. MLB Advanced Media, L.P., 517 F.3d 1284, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 111. Id. at 1292. 
 112. Id. at 1287. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. DBB Techs., 517 F.3d at 1287. 
 117. Id. at 1286. 
31
Black: Psst! Wanna Buy a Bridge? IP Transfers of Non-Existent Property
Published by Reading Room, 2015
554 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:3 
Pursuant to his agreement, David discussed this project with 
Schlumberger’s general counsel for software matters and the director 
of the lab in which David worked.118 Both testified at trial that they 
knew David was working on a “baseball simulator” project, that they 
had discussed the project with David and also between themselves, 
and that they did not believe at the time that the project belonged to 
Schlumberger.119 
In 2004, DDB filed a patent infringement action against Major 
League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P. (MLBAM),120 a partnership 
formed by the club owners of Major League Baseball that is “the 
internet and interactive branch of the league.”121 The suit alleged that 
MLBAM had infringed DDB’s patents.122 In response, MLBAM 
approached Schlumberger to acquire any interest that Schlumberger 
had in the patents in suit, and in 2006, obtained all of Schlumberger’s 
interest in the patents plus a retroactive license covering prior 
years.123 
MLBAM moved to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, and the district court granted the motion, finding that the 
patents in suit fell within the scope of David’s employment 
agreement.124 The district court relied particularly on the similarity of 
the DDB patents to two prior patents issued to Schlumberger that 
named David as the inventor, and on a 1992 letter from David to his 
brother Daniel, which the district court interpreted as an 
admission.125 
The lower court held that the employment agreement provided for 
an “automatic assignment” of Barstow’s rights and rejected DDB’s 
statute of limitations, waiver, estoppel, and laches defenses.126 In 
doing so, the Federal Circuit “relied” on three cases, Speedplay, Inc. 
                                                                                                                 
 118. Id. at 1287. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 1288. 
 121. Anteneh Belayneh, Top 10 Richest Sports Brands in the World, The RICHEST (Apr. 7, 2014), 
http://www.therichest.com/sports/top-10-richest-sports-brands-in-the-world/?view=all. 
 122. DBB Techs., 517 F.3d at 1288. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 1288–89. 
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v. Bebop, Inc., Arachnid, Inc. v. Merit Indus., Inc., and Rhone-
Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp.127 
1.   Speedplay 
Speedplay also relies upon Filmtec, arguing that the contract 
language created an “automatic assignment.”128 However, it does so 
without any elaboration, making the Federal Circuit’s coup in the 
area of assignment law all the stronger, if one judges solely by 
number of citations.129 
2.   Arachnid 
Arachnid, decided by the Federal Circuit the same year as 
Filmtec,130 comes to a contrary opinion. In fact, the Arachnid court 
recognized and cited to a correct statement about assignments of 
future patents: 
Although an agreement to assign in the future inventions not 
yet developed may vest the promisee with equitable rights in 
those inventions once made, such an agreement does not by itself 
vest legal title to patents on the inventions in the promisee: “The 
legal title to an invention can pass to another only by a 
conveyance which operates upon the thing invented after it has 
become capable of being made the subject of an application for a 
patent.”131 
One is left questioning why the Federal Circuit could take such 
differing positions in Arachnid and Filmtec.132 The results of this are 
                                                                                                                 
 127. Id. at 1290 (citing Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 284 F.3d 1323, 1328 
(Fed. Cir. 2002); Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc., 211 F.3d 1245, 2553 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Arachnid, Inc. v. 
Merit Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 1574, 1580–81 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). 
 128. DBB Techs., 517 F.3d at 1290. 
 129. Speedplay, Inc., 211 F.3d at 1253. 
 130. Arachnid, 939 F.2d at 1581; Filmtec Corp. v. Allied-Signal Inc., 939 F.2d 1568, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 
1991), vacated sub nom. Filmtec v. Hydranautics, 982 F.2d 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 131. Arachnid, 939 F.2d at 1581 (citing GEORGE CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS 
§ 170 (4th ed. 1873)) (emphasis added). 
 132. Id. at 1581; Filmtec Corp., 939 F.2d at 1568. 
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widespread. Not only do we now have to contend with “federal 
common law” in the patent area, but we also have to reconcile when 
it supplants state law concerning the ownership and transfer of 
property interests, both presently existing and in futuro. 
In fact, the Arachnid court cited to Six Wheel Corporation v. 
Sterling Motor Truck, which, in discussing what rights an inventor 
possesses, stated, “Obviously he cannot assign more than he has; and 
the crucial question here, to be discussed later, is how much less he 
can grant and still term the transfer an assignment.”133 
The whole idea of being able to transfer, pre-invention, rights to a 
patent must rest upon the notion that the inventor possesses those 
rights currently. This raises a multitude of property metaphysical 
questions: 
 
 Who possesses the rights to inventions not yet 
invented? 
 If I claim to be working on an invention, do I 
possess those future rights? What if I claim not to 
be working on the invention? 
 If competing researchers are all racing towards an 
invention (electricity!134 Light bulbs!135 Flight!136), 
do they all possess rights that they can transfer to an 
employer? 
 Must that transfer of rights be accompanied by 
consideration? What of the slower inventors who do 
                                                                                                                 
 133. Six Wheel Corp. v. Sterling Motor Truck Co., 50 F.2d 568, 570 (9th Cir. 1931). 
 134. War of the Currents, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/tesla/ll/ll_warcur.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2015) 
(Edison advocated for direct current—or “DC”—technology, and Edison’s company vigorously 
defended its patents. However, George Westinghouse advocated for alternating current—or “AC”—
technology, sought his own patented, competing system, and established Westinghouse Electric 
Company. Westinghouse 
also accumulated patents for alternating AC technologies from European inventors and licensed patents 
from Nikola Tesla.). 
 135. Lea Shaver, Illuminating Innovation: From Patent Racing to Patent War, 69 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1891, 1915 (2012); Susan Funaro, Inventors Who Lost the Race to the Patent Office, LEGAL ZOOM 
(Dec. 2009), http://www.legalzoom.com/intellectual-property-rights/patents/inventors-who-lost-race. 
 136. Daniel Terdiman, How the Wright Brothers Won the Race to Invent the Airplane, CNET (Jul. 9, 
2013, 7:57 AM), http://www.cnet.com/pictures/how-the-wright-brothers-won-the-race-to-invent-the-
airplane-pictures/. 
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not get to the patent first? Must they give the 
consideration back?137 
 
3.   Rhone-Poulenc Agro (RPA) 
RPA addresses whether a sublicensee (Monsanto) can claim it was 
a bona fide purchaser when the original license was obtained by 
fraud.138 From 1991 through 1994, RPA and DeKalb collaborated on 
a biotechnology project, and DeKalb obtained a license to one of 
RPA’s patents, which it then sublicensed to Monsanto.139 In 1997, 
RPA brought suit against DeKalb and Monsanto, alleging that 
DeKalb had acquired the license by fraud.140 A jury agreed with 
RPA.141 At that point, Monsanto argued that it was not infringing 
because it was a bona fide purchaser.142 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held: “In sum, the bona fide 
purchaser defense does not apply to non-exclusive licensees.”143 
Monsanto did not obtain legal title, and therefore could not use the 
bona fide purchaser claim.144 
That means that two of the cases cited by the DDB court 
specifically deal with legal and equitable title differences and held 
that legal title did not spring into being, either from a pre-patent 
contract or from a bona fide purchaser claim.145 
                                                                                                                 
 137. Patch v. Solar Corp., 149 F.2d 558, 560 (7th Cir. 1945) (quoting Texas Co. v. Hogarth Shipping 
Co., 256 U.S. 619, 629–30 (1921)) (“It long has been settled in the English courts and in those of this 
country, federal and state, that where parties enter into a contract on the assumption that some particular 
thing essential to its performance will continue to exist and be available for the purpose and neither 
agrees to be responsible for its continued existence and availability, the contract must be regarded as 
subject to an implied condition that, if before the time for performance and without the default of either 
party the particular thing ceases to exist or be available for the purpose, the contract shall be dissolved 
and the parties excused from performing it.”). 
 138. Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 284 F.3d 1323, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 1326. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 1334. 
 144. Rhone-Poulenc Agro, 284 F.3d at 1334. 
 145. DDB Techs., L.L.C. v. MLB Advanced Media, L.P., 517 F.3d 1284, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(citing Rhone-Poulenc Agro, 284 F.3d at 1328; Arachnid, Inc. v. Merit Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 1574 (Fed. 
Cir. 1991)). 
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That makes the DDB case all the more suspect. MLBAM obtained 
its title of the patents only by approaching David’s employer after 
license negotiations stalled and after David’s employer had let any 
possible claim lie dormant for years.146 In fact, David’s employer had 
taken steps to let David know that they did not consider his outside 
work to belong to them.147 How then could the court rationalize that 
the contract could create rights via an “automatic assignment”?148 
4.   The DDB Dissent 
Judge Newman filed a dissent, in which she took issue with “the 
various erroneous pronouncements of law, fact, and procedure with 
which this opinion is encumbered.”149 
The panel majority acknowledges “state contract law”, [sic] 
but announces that federal law preempts state law for 
employment contracts that include rights to patents, reasoning 
that “[a]lthough state law governs the interpretation of contracts 
generally, the question of whether a patent assignment clause 
creates an automatic assignment or merely an obligation to 
assign is intimately bound up with the question of standing in 
patent cases” and therefore is “a matter of federal law”. [sic] 
That is grievous overreaching, as well as contrary to law and 
precedent.150 
She continues: 
State statutory and common law have long been recognized as 
governing the ownership of patent property. There is no conflict 
between the creation of the patent as a creature of federal law, 
and ownership of patent property governed by state law. Federal 
preemption of state property law is not casually invoked. Absent 
                                                                                                                 
 146. Id. at 1288. 
 147. Id. at 1287. 
 148. Id. at 1288. 
 149. Id. at 1299 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 150. Id. at 1296. 
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a specific act of Congress, there must be a conflict between 
federal and state law before the state is deprived of its authority. 
No statutory preemption or federal/state conflict is here 
postulated. There is no authority for preempting state law, no 
authority for eliminating state law principles of property 
ownership, no authority for divesting state authority to determine 
rights and obligations set by employment contract, no authority 
for rejecting the extensive state precedent of law and procedure 
governing these issues. 
State law governing employment contract interpretation is not 
excised when patents are involved. Employment contracts are 
generally governed by the law of the state of employment, in 
turn founded on the common law and state policy considerations 
embodied in statute. The complex balance between an 
employer’s rights to control its proprietary information and 
safeguard its commercial interests, and an employee’s rights to 
use his experience for purposes outside of the employer’s 
interests, has traditionally been subject of state law, and when 
dispute arises, has been subject to trial to a jury. The experience, 
and precedent, of state courts is extensive on these questions.151 
Commentators have noted that the majority decision in DDB 
causes problems and represents a major shift in the law.152 
                                                                                                                 
 151. DDB Techs., 517 F.3d at 1296–97 (citations omitted). 
 152. See Shannon H. Hedvat, Note, A New Age of Pro-Employer Rights: Are Automatic Assignments 
the Standard?, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 817, 817–18 (2011); Ian N. Feinberg, Eric B. Evans & Andrew M. 
Holmes, Consequences of the Federal Circuit’s New Reliance on Federal Common Law to Interpret 
Patent Assignment Agreements, 3 LANDSLIDE 24, 25 (2011). Strangely enough, the district court in 
Stanford found that there should be a difference between federally funded patents and private 
assignments. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., C05-04158 
MHP, 2008 WL 706251, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2008) (“Second, Cadence is inapplicable here as it had 
no relation to government funding or the Bayh-Dole Act and considered purely private assignment 
agreements. Third, although Judge Newman’s dissent may have some limited precedential value as 
Roche claims, the majority decision denying mandamus certainly has greater precedential value. Finally, 
DDB is inapplicable here as it had no relation to government funding or the Bayh-Dole Act and 
considered purely private assignment agreements.”). For federally funded inventions, the inventor owns 
the patent until it is assigned, but for all others it can be anticipatorily assigned? This makes no sense at 
all. 
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The bigger question is why some universities—including 
Stanford—continued using the “agree to assign” language even 
after FilmTec and, for California universities, Shaw. Holding 
aside the case where the universities might simply have 
remained ignorant about the state of the law, there are a few 
reasons why these universities may have chosen to take the risks 
of continuing to use the obligation to assign language. One is 
that the university will not know at the time of a researcher’s hire 
whether all, or even which, of her future inventions should be 
university property. Second, the university may (incorrectly) 
believe that it cannot take title to things that do not yet exist. 
Third, the university may be confusing the federal tax exempt 
rules prohibiting the assignment of expectant interests by the 
entity to others with the permissible assignment of expectant 
interests from an employee or contractor to the entity.153 
Following it would cause havoc with Lucas v. Earl (anticipatory 
assignments), so that for tax purposes, even if you assign a future 
invention, you must recognize the income when the invention is 
“transferred” for tax purposes.154 
E.   Losing FilmTec and DDB 
Other commentators have disagreed with the Federal Circuit’s 
decisions. 
It would seem, therefore, that the Federal Circuit’s notion that 
an expectancy contract interest could transform into a legal title 
by operation of law, without any further act on the part of the 
assignor, is a fiction that flies in the face of legal and practical 
realities. The only way legal title in a patent can be transferred 
from an inventor to another party is through a written document 
                                                                                                                 
 153. O’Connor, supra note 95, at 39. “Even among some IP professors there is a belief that this is 
prohibited under the commercial law doctrine on nemo dat quod non habet. This is clearly rejected by 
the Federal Circuit in its decisions beginning at least with FilmTec.” Id. at 39 n.54. 
 154. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114–15 (1930). 
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executed after a patent has issued, or after, or concurrently with, 
the filing of a patent application. Furthermore, it does not matter 
whether the employee-inventor has signed an employment 
agreement in which he or she has agreed to presently assign 
patent rights in future inventions. Legal title cannot pass to the 
employer until an assignment document is executed after a 
patent has issued or a patent application has been filed, and legal 
title can only be protected by recording the assignment document 
with the USPTO.155 
Moreover, consider the following: 
Since Stanford v. Roche, the Federal Circuit has applied the 
same rule—that “[t]he question of whether or not an agreement 
provides for automatic assignment is a matter of federal law”—
in SiRF Technology, Inc. v. International Trade Commission and 
Imation Corp. v. Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. 
But the Federal Circuit has not been consistent in applying 
this rule. Indeed, in September 2010 a Federal Circuit panel, 
without citing a single case, unanimously applied state law to 
interpret a patent assignment agreement for purposes of standing: 
“[a]n assignment of a patent is interpreted in accordance with 
statutory and common law of contract.” . . . Thus, there are now 
two contemporaneous and apparently irreconcilable Federal 
Circuit lines of cases on whether state law or federal common 
law governs interpretation of assignment agreements for 
purposes of determining standing.156 
What these commentators have found is that by attempting to change 
long-standing principles of property law, the Federal Circuit has 
really just created a mess. “And despite the fact that DDB was 
                                                                                                                 
 155. Ted Hagelin, The Unintended Consequences of Stanford v. Roche, 39 AIPLA Q.J. 335, 349–50 
(2011). “The Patent Act therefore contemplates that a transfer of legal title to patents or patent 
applications can only be accomplished after the patent has issued or after the patent application has been 
filed, respectively.” Id. at 347; see also Feinberg, supra note 152. 
 156. Feinberg, supra note 152, at 25. 
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ignored by Tri-Star, the Federal Circuit’s effort to create a uniform 
rule for determining when an assignment agreement transfers legal 
title and confers standing is unnecessary and creates other, perhaps 
irreconcilable, conflicts with state law.”157 
We could attempt to reconcile the mess by trying to answer the 
question posed earlier: Doesn’t awarding the original ownership of a 
patent to the employee-inventor present a hardship on the employer? 
The obvious answer is Yes. However, does that mean that the 
employer’s hardship condones such an obvious departure from well-
settled and reasoned principles of property law? And even if we 
believe that the reason the Supreme Court would implicitly adopt this 
shift in the Roche case is because either the parties failed to 
adequately brief the issue or that no one was concerned with the 
resulting legal mess, we still end up with a legal mess. 
III.   NON-EXISTENT OR AFTER ACQUIRED PROPERTY 
Perhaps the most important and familiar argument for stare decisis 
is one of public legitimacy. The respect given the Court by the public 
and by the other branches of government rests in large part on the 
knowledge that the Court is not composed of unelected judges free to 
write their policy views into law.158 
The Roche case was not dealing with new legal principles,159 even 
though we like to think that new technology and IP must involve new 
ideas. In fact, the concept of dealing with contracts for property not 
yet in existence is old.160 We frequently start with the concept cited 
above that one may not transfer that which one does not own,161 and 
from there examine what happens when contracts are nonetheless 
made for land, money, goods or services to be acquired, made or 
provided in the future. 
                                                                                                                 
 157. Id. at 26. 
 158. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 281, 286–87 
(1990). 
 159. See Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 
2188 (2011). 
 160. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Winslow, 17 F. Cas. 527 (C.C.D. Me. 1843). 
 161. See, e.g., Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 284 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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A.   Transfers of Land Not Yet Owned 
The after-acquired property doctrine is generally raised when a 
person purports to convey a property right that the person does not 
possess.162 After obtaining the right to property, the grantor attempts 
to avoid the obligation under the conveyance on the grounds that the 
grantor did not have title in the first place.163 An illustration of this 
would be a son receiving 100 acres of land in a will from his father. 
Before obtaining title to the land, the son conveys his interest to a 
friend for consideration. Regretting this conveyance once in 
possession of the land, the son attempts to void the contract on the 
ground that he did not have possession at the time the contract was 
formed. This doctrine is, in effect, an estoppel doctrine, which binds 
a grantor to his conveyance of land that he did not own, once it 
comes into his possession.164 The intent of the doctrine is to protect 
innocent grantees from a grantor who conveys land he doesn’t have, 
but acquires later, by automatically transferring that property to the 
grantee.165 Therefore, this doctrine would force the son to fulfill his 
obligation to the friend under the terms of the conveyance once in 
possession of the property. 
According to the New York Appellate Division: 
An assignment of something which has no present, actual or 
even potential existence when the assignment is made does not 
operate to transfer the legal title to that thing when it does come 
into existence. Such an instrument, if made in good faith for a 
valuable consideration and not void as against public policy, 
operates as an executory contract to transfer such after acquired 
property, and creates an equitable lien thereon. But the legal title 
remains in the assignor. And at law that title is not transferred 
until either the equitable lien is enforced by judicial decree or 
some new act intervenes by which the assignor puts the assignee 
                                                                                                                 
 162. 23 AM. JUR. 2D Deeds § 278 (2014) (listing recent cases supporting these assertions). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See id. 
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in possession thereof.166 
B.   Transfers of Money Not Yet Owned 
Williams v. Ingersoll is one of the first cases in the United States 
that mentions the ability to transfer personal property that the person 
does not yet own.167 The case concerns attorneys who wanted to be 
paid for their services out of any money that their client might obtain 
from any lawsuits or proceedings.168 The New York Court of 
Appeals noted that courts will support assignment of things that have 
“no present, actual or potential existence, but rest in mere possibility; 
not, indeed, as a present, positive transfer, operative in presenti, for 
that can only be of a thing in esse, but as a present contract, to take 
effect and attach as soon as the thing comes in esse.”169 
Therefore, the court held that, “even the assignment of freight to 
be earned in the future is good in equity, and will be enforced against 
the party from whom it becomes due.”170 The court decided, like any 
other assignment or contract, that specific performance is required 
when an assignor is able to transfer the thing assigned.171 
C.   Transfers of Goods Not Yet Owned 
Goods that are both existing and identified are “goods”; however, 
if they are not both existing and identified, they are considered 
“future goods.”172 Future goods can include goods that physically 
exist but are not owned by the seller and unproduced goods.173 
Article 2 of the U.C.C. explains the sale of future goods or any 
interest in them operates merely as a contract to sell.174 Therefore, no 
                                                                                                                 
 166. Blumenthal v. Comm’r, 15 B.T.A. 1394, 1396 (1929), aff’d, 60 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1932) 
(citations omitted) (quoting In re Black, 123 N.Y.S. 371, 373 (1910)). 
 167. Williams v. Ingersoll, 89 N.Y. 508, 508 (1882). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 518 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1040 (9th ed. 1866)). 
 170. Id. at 518. 
 171. Id. at 519. 
 172. Dale Joseph Gilsinger, Annotation, What Constitutes “Future Goods” Within Scope of U.C.C. 
Article 2, 48 A.L.R. 6TH 475, 475, 491 (2009). 
 173. Id. at 486. 
 174. Id. at 487. 
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sale can be made of future goods; it must be a contract to sell goods 
at a future date.175 Since a seller does not have title to future goods, 
there can be no transfer of title at the time of contract, and thus no 
sale.176 
For example, in In re Carman, 399 B.R. 599, 48 A.L.R.6th 
687 (Bankr. D. Md. 2009) (applying Maryland law), where a 
buyer contracted to purchase a custom-built boat, and where the 
builder failed to timely complete the boat, resold the hull to 
another buyer, and then filed for bankruptcy while the hull was 
still incapable of either self-propulsion or flotation, it was held 
that when the bankruptcy was filed the hull remained a “future” 
good with respect to the first buyer’s contract under Maryland’s 
version of § 2-105(1), Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 2-105(2), 
because it was neither identified to the contract nor an existing 
boat.177 
In T.B. Harms & Francis, Day & Hunter v. Stern, the Second 
Circuit considered the legal effect of a contract that “‘sold, assigned, 
and transferred’ the right ‘to print, publish, and sell’ all compositions 
which [the composer] ‘might write’ during a period of five years 
from the date of agreement.”178 The court held the sale agreement for 
plaintiff’s future compositions did not vest legal title in the 
defendants because these compositions were future goods and did not 
exist at the time of the agreement.179 Finding there was no valid sale, 
the decision affirmed common law doctrine, which states, “at law one 
cannot transfer by a present sale what he does not then own, although 
he expects to acquire it.”180 Therefore, while the agreement was not a 
legal contract of sale, it operated as an executory agreement to sell.181 
                                                                                                                 
 175. Id. at 486. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 475. 
 178. T.B. Harms & Francis, Day & Hunter v. Stern, 229 F. 42, 49 (2d Cir. 1915), rev’d on other 
grounds, 231 F. 645 (2d Cir. 1916). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. (“The common-law doctrine is expressed in the maxim ‘Licet dispositio de interesse futuro sit 
inutilis tamen potest fieri declaratio praecedens quae sortiatur effectum interveniente novo actu.’ The 
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D.   Transfers of Intellectual Property Not Yet Owned 
There is an “idea that intellectual property is simply a species of 
real property rather than a unique form of legal protection.”182 
“Congress, the courts, and commentators increasingly treat 
intellectual property . . . as a good in and of itself.”183 However, there 
has not been a consistent application of the rules of real or personal 
property, and many courts seem to apply the legal principles 
haphazardly. 
In Regan Vapor-Engine Co. v. Pacific Gas-Engine Co., the parties 
entered into an agreement to “‘license, and grant and convey, each to 
the other, . . . all such inventions and improvements, whether 
patented or not, which may be hereafter made by either of us,’ in gas-
engines and the mechanism by which they are operated.”184 
The “agreement was never recorded in the patent-office,” and the 
court felt that it could not be.185 The court reasoned although the 
agreement contained language such as “grant and convey,” it was not 
sufficient to grant an assignment of a patent.186 In doing so, “[the 
agreement] may be good as an agreement to sell and assign a future 
invention, but it cannot operate as a sale or assignment of such an 
invention, even when made.”187 
The court, continuing its analysis, looked to several treatises: 
Chancellor Kent says, (2 Comm. 468:) 
 
“The thing sold must have an actual or potential existence, 
and be specific or identified, and capable of delivery; otherwise 
                                                                                                                 
common law prevents the sale of things which the vendor has not in his possession by falling back upon 
the common-sense notion that if one has not a thing to sell he cannot sell it.”). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX L. REV. 1031, 1031 
(2005). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Regan Vapor-Engine Co. v. Pac. Gas-Engine Co., 49 F. 68, 68 (9th Cir. 1892). 
 185. Id. at 69. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. The Ninth Circuit elaborated: “No one can sell that which he hath not.” Id. (citation omitted). 
It also referenced the analogy: “A man cannot grant all the wool that shall grow upon his sheep that he 
shall buy afterwards, for there he hath it not actually or potentially.” Id. (citation omitted). 
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it is not strictly a contract of sale, but a special or executory 
agreement. But, if the article intended to be sold has no 
existence, there can be no contract of sale.” 
 
Benjamin, in his work on Sales, (section 78,) says: 
 
“In relation to things not yet in existence, or not yet belonging 
to the vendor, the law considers them as divided into two classes, 
one of which may be sold, while the other can only be the 
subject of an agreement to sell,—of an executory contract. 
Things not yet existing, which may be sold, are those which may 
be said to have a potential existence; that is, things which are the 
natural product or expected increase of something already 
belonging to the vendor. A man may sell the crop of hay to be 
grown on his field, the wool to be clipped from his sheep at a 
future time, the milk that cows will yield in the coming month, 
and the sale is valid. But he can only make a valid agreement to 
sell, not an actual sale, where the subject of the contract is 
something to be afterwards acquired, as the wool of any sheep, 
or the milk of any cows, that he may buy within the year, or any 
goods to which he may obtain title within the next six months.” 
A man may make a valid agreement to sell an invention not yet 
made by him, but he cannot make a valid sale thereof. 
 
Curtis on Patents (section 160) says: 
 
“The statutes, however, which authorize the assignment of an 
invention before the patent has been obtained, appear to embrace 
only the cases of perfected or completed inventions. There can, 
properly speaking, be no assignment of an inchoate or 
incomplete invention, although a contract to convey a future 
invention may be valid, and may be enforced by a bill for 
specific performance. But the legal title of an invention can pass 
to another only by a conveyance which operates upon the thing 
invented after it has become capable of being made the subject 
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of an application for a patent.” 
 
Mr. Robinson, in his work on Patents, (volume 2, § 771,) says: 
 
“A contract for the transfer of inventions not yet in being is 
valid as a contract, but is not an assignment. The subject-matter 
of an assignment is an existing invention, not only conceived as 
an idea of means, but actually reduced to practice, and thus 
invested with the inchoate or perfected right to that monopoly 
which must always pass with the invention in this form of 
conveyance. An intended or incomplete invention rests merely in 
purpose and expectation. It does not clothe the proposed inventor 
with any special privileges, or entitle him to any special rights in 
the monopoly which, if his purposes were accomplished, he 
might be able to secure. The transfer of such future inventions is 
a mere executory contract, to assign them if they happen to be 
made.”188 
To the general rule that a party cannot make a valid sale of a future 
invention, the court recognized that there is one exception “where a 
patentee assigns a patent already issued, together with all future 
improvements thereon. It has been held that such assignments pass 
the title to the future improvements.”189 However, the court found the 
exception was inapplicable because “there is no assignment of a 
patent, with any improvements thereon.”190 The parties’ agreement 
was, “at most, an attempted assignment of any independent 
inventions to be thereafter made, by either of the contracting parties, 
in gas-engines.”191 
“Attempted” assignments are certainly not the same thing as 
“automatic” assignments. 
                                                                                                                 
 188. Id. at 69–70. 
 189. Id. at 70. 
 190. Regan, 49 F. at 70. 
 191. Id. 
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E.   Assignments of Contract Rights 
Rights arising out of contract may also be assigned, but is the 
assignment valid before the right comes into being? And when does a 
contract right come into being? 
“Historically, all assignments of choses in action were 
unenforceable on the theory of conflict with rules against champerty 
and maintenance or because the materialism of courts precluded 
recognition of a conceptual transfer of rights.”192 
However, courts of equity began to recognize assignments of 
choses in action.193 Subsequently, assignments became so significant 
that they were even recognized by courts of law, “although they 
initially required the assignee to sue in the name of his assignor.”194 
As partial assignees were prohibited from joining an action at law, 
their only remedies remained in courts of equity.195 “In most 
jurisdictions, however, procedural rules are presently no obstacle to 
the creation of assignments enforceable at law. And the distinction 
between legal and equitable assignments which persists has an 
implication other than that originally comprehended by the terms.”196 
Is there a good basis for distinguishing between present and future 
rights? With real estate conveyances, we retain some measure of 
protection against future transfers of possession by the same rationale 
as that in favor of a Rule Against Perpetuities—that transfers of 
future rights may well tie up property for many, many years into the 
future and stymie the free movement of capital.197 
                                                                                                                 
 192. Comment, Contract Rights as Commercial Security: Present and Future Intangibles, 67 YALE 
L.J. 847, 851–52 (1958) [hereinafter Contract Rights]. 
 193. Id. at 852. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. “Where this limitation on joinder continues in effect, the partial assignee’s enforcement 
possibilities are still so restricted; the assignment of a partial fixed sum or a fixed percentage of 
contractual rights is denied the status of a legal assignment.” Id. 
 196. Id. at 852–53. 
 197. Id. at 853–55. 
The potential assignor has a present interest in payments due upon his future 
performance. Such a right, however, must be clearly distinguished from an expectancy—
property to which a party has no enforceable claim but of which he anticipates possession 
at some future date. Only in a limited number of jurisdictions may an expectancy support 
a legal assignment. While the basis for distinguishing between present and anticipated 
rights is uncertain, the corollary requirement that an assigned right be identifiable has in 
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This argument is a valid one, particularly with respect to intangible 
property. Future conveyances muddy existing recording systems, and 
add cost to the transaction since every buyer must now guard against 
the possibility that the property in question may have been 
transferred years before it came into being.198 
This notion troubled some of the commentators of Article 2 of the 
UCC.199 Property must exist before it can be transferred, does it not? 
Or are all transfers just a species of contract rights? In fact, “an 
agreement which purports to transfer goods not yet owned by the 
seller is a mere contract relationship, and can not operate as a present 
conveyance of a property interest.”200 
A related issue is raised by the Stanford case.201 “In 1991, Roche 
Molecular Systems, a company that specializes in diagnostic blood 
screening, acquired Cetus’s PCR-related assets, including all rights 
Cetus had obtained through agreements like the VCA signed by 
Holodniy.”202 This actually occurred when “Roche purchased Cetus’s 
‘PCR business,’ including its agreements with Stanford and its 
researchers, through an ‘Asset Purchase Agreement.’”203 
                                                                                                                 
part furnished a rationalization. The courts at common law, unsympathetic to conveyance 
of intangibles, determined that interests which an assignor did not possess at assignment 
were not susceptible to the requisite specific identification. Nonetheless, the present-
future dichotomy is continued even where the requirement of identification could be 
fulfilled, largely in an attempt to restrict a lender’s ability to secure well into the future all 
available resources of the borrower. 
Id. 
 198. See Contract Rights, supra note 192. 
 199. Jeanne L. Schroeder, Death and Transfiguration: The Myth that the U.C.C. Killed “Property”, 
69 TEMP. L. REV. 1281, 1312–14 (1996). 
 200. Id. at 1313. “Goods must be both existing and identified before any interest in them can pass. 
Goods which are not both existing and identified are ‘future’ goods. A purported present sale of future 
goods or of any interest therein, operates as a contract to sell.” Id. (citing U.C.C. § 2-105(2)). 
This idea of property as legal relations with respect to an external object or res is also 
included in the requirements of Article 9 and the Bankruptcy Code that a security interest 
cannot attach until the debtor obtains “rights in the collateral or property.” It is 
meaningless to speak of the property right known as a security interest without an object 
called collateral because the rights conveyed by the debtor to the secured party include 
precisely the rights to take possession, and realize value by either alienating or enjoying 
identifiable collateral. 
Id. at 1313–14. 
 201. See generally Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 
S. Ct 2188 (2011). 
 202. Id. at 2192. 
 203. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 583 F.3d 832, 
48
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 2
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol31/iss3/2
2015] IP TRANSFERS OF NON-EXISTENT PROPERTY 571 
What assets did Cetus possess at the time? There were no 
patents.204 “In May 1992, Stanford filed the patent application to 
which the patents-in-suit claim priority.”205 On the institution of the 
lawsuit, Stanford was named the assignee on the three patents issued 
from 1999–2006.206 
This means that Roche “bought” a future contract right to a patent 
that did not exist from someone who was not the inventor. 
IV.   PATENT LAW ON FUTURE INVENTIONS 
Roads? Where we’re going, we don’t need roads. 
Dr. Emmett Brown, Back to the Future 
 
Justice Breyer’s dissent in the Stanford case cites the law regarding 
a transfer of an unknown, future invention. “[P]atent law appears to 
have long specified that a present assignment of future inventions (as 
in both contracts here) conveyed equitable, but not legal, title.”207 
We could contrast these facts with those in Gayler,208 where the 
invention existed but the patent did not (yet). Obviously, employers 
of inventors that wish to take title to future inventions favor broad, 
easy to implement rules with regard to future inventions. But does 
that serve to make a workable legal system? 
                                                                                                                 
837–38 (Fed. Cir. 2009) aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011). 
 204. See id. 
 205. Id. at 838. 
 206. Id. “The ‘730 patent issued on October 19, 1999; the ‘705 patent on January 7, 2003; and the 
‘041 patent on October 31, 2006, after this lawsuit began. Stanford is the named assignee of all three 
patents.” Id. 
 207. Bd. Of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2188, 
2203 (Breyer, J., dissenting). “‘A contract to convey a future invention . . . cannot alone authorize a 
patent to be taken by the party in whose favor such a contract was intended to operate.’” Id. (quoting G. 
Curtis, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 155 (3d ed. 1867)). “‘The rule 
generally applicable grants equitable enforcement to an assignment of an expectancy but demands a 
further act, either reduction to possession or further assignment of the right when it comes into 
existence.’” Id. (quoting Comment, Contract Rights as Commercial Security: Present and Future 
Intangibles, 67 YALE L. J. 847, 854, n.27 (1958)). 
 208. Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. 477, 480 (1850). 
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A.   Self Help 
The Federal Circuit’s decision to create federal common law that 
provides for the “automatic” transfer of patents that do not yet exist is 
another form of self-help legislation.209 Unlike other areas that make 
use of self-help remedies, however, there was not a need for another 
remedy. Although employers complained that the system requires 
them to expend greater effort to police their investment, the first in 
time rule actually works in this case. We would expect that a lab such 
as Cetus would know that a researcher might already have a contract 
obligating him or her to transfer any patents to their employer (in 
fact, we would be shocked otherwise). 
That means that the lab would be on inquiry notice, and could then 
be in a position to negotiate a license or an option right to the 
patent(s) developed as a result of the research relationship. In many 
cases, this is a good thing, since many universities are more 
interested in the research potential and are less able to exploit any 
commercial applications of the patents that they apply for. 
The Stanford decision, however, fundamentally altered contract 
and patent law.210 “‘[O]nce the invention is made and [the] 
application for [a] patent is filed, . . . legal title to the rights accruing 
thereunder would be in the assignee [i.e., Cetus] . . . , and the 
assignor-inventor would have nothing remaining to assign.’”211 
Which brings us back to where we started (but much wiser!). 
                                                                                                                 
 209. See Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1089 (1998); Douglas Lichtman, How the Law Responds to Self-Help, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 215 
(2005); Edward L. Rubin, The Code, the Consumer, and the Institutional Structure of the Common Law, 
75 WASH. U. L.Q. 11, 37 (1997); Henry E. Smith, Self-Help and the Nature of Property, 1 J.L. ECON. & 
POL’Y 69 (2005). 
 210. See Leland Stanford., 131 S. Ct. at 2203. 
 211. Id. at 2202 (quoting Flimtec Corp., 939 F.2d at 1572). 
The Federal Circuit held that the earlier Stanford agreement’s use of the words “agree to 
assign,” when compared with the later Cetus agreement’s use of the words “do hereby 
assign,” made all the difference. It concluded that, once the invention came into 
existence, the latter words meant that the Cetus agreement trumped the earlier, Stanford 
agreement. That, in the Circuit’s view, is because the latter words operated upon the 
invention automatically, while the former did not. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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Requiring existing university employees to assign inventions 
to the university presents problems. Assignment by an existing 
employee must be supported by additional consideration beyond 
that provided in support of the employee’s original employment 
contract. Before Stanford v. Roche, university employers could 
effectively claim faculty’s patent rights by including patent 
assignment language in the university’s administrative policies. 
The Federal Circuit held that by accepting appointment subject 
to those administrative guidelines, university faculty obligated 
themselves to abide by those guidelines, including assigning 
inventions to the university. It is unclear, however, whether this 
method remains viable in the wake of Stanford v. Roche.212 
And if additional consideration is or is not required, then there are 
implications for faculty compensation and taxation. The decision 
simply created more traps for the unwary, not a simpler self-help 
system. 
B.   Application to Foreign Legal Systems 
Patent law in the U.S. is not practiced in a vacuum. Most, if not all, 
inventions rely on, and impact the global marketplace. So if the 
Federal Circuit’s rationale and the Stanford case really mark a shift in 
U.S. patent policy, how will that policy affect the rights of inventors 
and employers worldwide? 
The English position allows assignment of a future invention’s 
legal title earlier than Filmtec would permit.213 The assignee’s legal 
remedies in enforcing his interest under the English position is 
unclear.214 “[H]ow could an assignee enforce a proprietary right to 
something, unless and until, the invention comes into existence?”215 
Furthermore, under the English position the effect different language 
                                                                                                                 
 212. Tresemer, supra note 5, at 371 (2012). 
 213. Puran, supra note 108, at 211. Filmtec allows “legal assignment, only once an invention is 
made.” Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
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will have on the assignment of a future invention is unknown.216 
Comparing the English version of Filmtec, KCI Licensing v. Smith & 
Nephew, Sangeeta Puran hypothesized: 
If KCI Licensing is accepted as allowing for legal title to pass 
even before the invention comes into existence, and the 
distinction in language is irrelevant, then it follows that such a 
position would actually treat the assignment to Stanford as the 
first and prevailing legal assignment. 
If the distinction in language is relevant, and the assignment 
must contain “hereby assigns” language, then the assignment to 
Cetus would still prevail. In this scenario, for practical purposes, 
whether the legal assignment is effective before, or alternatively, 
on the invention coming into existence, may make little 
difference because this is effectively the same as applying 
FilmTec: the prevailing assignment will be the first assignment 
to use the wording blessed by the Federal Circuit. 
. . . 
If the position in the UK is the Snell principle (i.e. an 
assignment to a future invention is an equitable assignment, with 
at best such assignment giving rise to a beneficial interest at the 
time the invention comes into existence), then the position under 
English law is consistent with the position assumed by the 
dissenting Judge, Breyer, J. This would result in Stanford’s 
equitable interest, being first in time, prevailing over Cetus.217 
I particularly like: “It is unclear, however, to what remedy such a 
legal interest would entitle an assignee, in particular, how could an 
assignee enforce a proprietary right to something, unless and until, 
the invention comes into existence?”218 
Doesn’t that make the right, and the property, illusory? 
                                                                                                                 
 216. Id. “The distinction between these two different forms of the assignment declaration, ‘hereby 
assigns’ versus ‘agrees to assign,’ was not considered in KCI Licensing as both types of wording were 
included in the assignment clause of interest.” Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
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C.   Impact on Patent Transfer Agreements 
Consider Little v. Hall, concerning an agreement assigning the 
rights of a manuscript not yet created.219 
The laws of the United States afford remedies, and the federal 
courts have jurisdiction only in favor of the “author” of a book or 
“his legal assigns,” or the “author or legal proprietor” of a 
manuscript. Of course, a book or manuscript belongs primarily 
under the copyright laws to the author. The plaintiffs not being 
the “author,” must therefore deduce from him a “legal” right and 
title to the book or manuscript, or else they cannot sustain their 
bill in the federal courts. If they can allege any other rights 
which have been violated, these must be asserted in the state 
courts, and on some general principle of equity or of law.220 
If there is no book, there can be no “author.” Similarly, if there is 
no invention, there can be no inventor. The Federal Circuit, in 
attempting to ease the way for employers to safeguard their 
investment in research and development, have created a strange result 
when we begin to speak of patent transfer agreements. How do you 
agree to transfer all things that you might create? What incentives 
does that foster? 
Justice Breyer raised a similar issue in his dissent concerning the 
different outcomes when applying the pre-Filmtec rule versus the 
Filmtec rule.221 Initially, agreements regarding future inventions only 
gave rise to claims in equity.222 After Filmtec, courts “adopted the 
new rule . . . a rule that distinguishes between these equitable claims 
and, in effect, says that Cetus must win. The Federal Circuit provided 
no explanation for what seems a significant change in the law. Nor 
                                                                                                                 
 219. See generally Little v. Hall, 59 U.S. 165 (1856). 
 220. Little, 59 U.S. at 167–68. 
 221. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2188, 
2203 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 222. Id. “[B]oth the initial . . . agreements would have given rise only to equitable interests in Dr. 
Holodniy’s invention . . . Stanford’s contract came first and that Stanford subsequently obtained a 
postinvention assignment as well should have meant that Stanford . . . would receive the rights its 
contract conveyed.” Id. 
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did it give any explanation for that change in its opinion in this case. 
The Federal Circuit’s FilmTec rule undercuts the objectives of the 
Bayh–Dole Act.” 223 Furthermore, “the Federal Circuit’s reasoning 
brings about an interpretation contrary to the intention of the parties 
to the earlier, Stanford contract. And it runs counter to what may well 
have been the drafters’ reasonable expectations of how courts would 
interpret the relevant language.”224 
CONCLUSION 
A turn-of-the-century confidence man named George C. 
Parker actually sold the Brooklyn Bridge more than once. 
According to Carl Sifakis, who tells his story in “Hoaxes and 
Scams: A Compendium of Deceptions, Ruses and Swindles,” 
Parker—who was also adept at selling the Metropolitan Museum 
of Art, the Statue of Liberty and Grant’s Tomb—produced 
impressive forged documents to prove that he was the bridge’s 
owner, then convinced his buyers that they could make a fortune 
by controlling access to the roadway. “Several times,” Mr. 
Sifakis wrote, “Parker’s victims had to be rousted from the 
bridge by police when they tried to erect toll barriers.”225 
Given the importance of IP and innovation in the modern 
economy, we will continue to see agreements to transfer non-existent 
IP proliferate. Governments, universities, and private laboratories all 
have an interest in continued funding of research, and at the same 
time, have an interest in protecting their access226 to the IP that 
results from their funding efforts. 
To this end, the law’s approach to the types of contracts that 
attempt to transfer assets that do not now (and may not ever) exist is 
                                                                                                                 
 223. Id. (citations omitted). Those who are aware “may be able to meet the FilmTec rule in future 
contracts simply by copying the precise words blessed by the Federal Circuit, the rule nonetheless 
remains a technical drafting trap for the unwary.” Id. 
 224. Id (citation omitted). 
 225. Cohen, supra note 1. 
 226. I could have used the term “right” instead, but with IP more than any other type of asset, a shared 
approach to the costs and benefits has worked out to be the most workable and the most beneficial. 
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critical. Striking the wrong balance between the interests of 
employers, researchers, and users of these types of assets is costly, 
can undermine the purposes behind development and innovation, and 
can lead to even more litigation. 
The current trend of the law, as evidenced by the decisions of the 
Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court, is ill advised. While it may 
seem like a good idea to allow “automatic” transfers blessed by 
operation of law, this system upsets the normal system of property 
transfer, and does so well in advance of any property actually coming 
into being. This in turn will lead to a confused system of title, in 
which investors and those who wish to utilize the IP will have to 
spend ever more time and resources to determine whether an inventor 
has executed an agreement containing sufficient language to invoke 
the “automatic” assignment doctrine.227 
Without the “automatic” assignment doctrine, putative assignees 
are left with equitable title, since the Supreme Court reaffirmed that 
the original patent is granted to the inventor. This leaves us with only 
one source to which we may turn to determine who has title. 
Potential purchasers still must be concerned with the first in time 
rule, but the long-standing nature of that rule in our property system 
reinforces, rather than supplants, existing notions of fairness. 
In the case of Stanford v. Roche Molecular Systems, Stanford 
would be in the best position at the hiring of its researchers to ask if 
they had any previous transfer agreements, and when researchers 
were lent out to third party labs, it would be then that those parties 
could ask the same question. Priorities to the patent can be traced 
back in time to the inventor. 
Instead, we now have a system where each party attempts to trump 
with “automatic” agreements, and it is not clear when any of those 
automatic agreements may have been made. If a researcher were to 
change jobs, could an old employer’s agreement nonetheless still be 
effective as to any future patent or invention? In such a system, order 
will be hard to come by. At that point, what is the value of innovation 
                                                                                                                 
 227. “[O]nce the invention came into existence, the latter words [do hereby assign] meant that the 
Cetus agreement trumped the earlier, Stanford agreement.” Leland Stanford, 131 S. Ct. at 2202. 
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and creativity? Can we put any stock in the fact that an invention 
belongs to an inventor, if it is also possible that the inventor may 
have already transferred all of her rights away? 
“When it comes to victims and victimizers, perhaps the humorist 
Will Rogers deserves the last word. ‘They may call me a “rube” and 
a “hick,” he said, ‘But I’d a lot rather be the man who bought the 
Brooklyn Bridge than the man who sold it.’”228 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 228. See Cohen, supra note 1. 
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